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Recent Cases
AGENCY-RATIFICATION OF SERVANT'S ToRTIous ACT
State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Shain1
In an assault and battery action against defendant and its employee, the
superintendent of the motor coach division, the evidence showed that the em-
ployee, while riding home in one of the defendant's streetcars, got off and
assaulted the plaintiff, whose car, having been stopped on the streetcar's track
by virtue of a red traffic signal, had hindered the streetcar's progress. It was
shown also that following the alleged assault the employee was retained in the
defendant's employ, that defendant's attorneys, upon the advice of defendant's
general solicitor, defended the employee in police court on the charge of assault-
ing plaintiff, and, in addition, took an appeal for him, all without compensation
from the employee-defendant.
Held: In quashing defendant's writ of certiorari, evidence that defendant's
attorney defended employee in police court and took an appeal from police court
to circuit court tended to establish a ratification by defendant of employee's
tortious act.
The problem here presented, the master's ratification of a servant's tort and
the legal consequences attaching thereto, was commented upon by Mr. Justice
Holmes, when sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in the
following terms: "If we were contriving a new code today we might hesitate to
say that a man could make himself a party to a bare tort in any case by merely
assenting to it after it had been committed."2 The doctrine is, however, widely
accepted today.
Generally it is held that a person, either natural or artificial, is not liable for
the acts or negligence of another, unless the relation of master and servant or
principal and agent3 exists between them, whereby the tortious act of the servant
can be legally imputed to the master.4 The doctrine of ratification, however,
proceeds on the theory that while there was no authority prior to the act in
question, and hence the relation of master and servant did not in fact exist,
1. 134 S. W. (2d) 58 (Mo. 1939).
2. Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N. E. 279 (1891).
3. 2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1855, states that the relation of
master and servant and that of principal and agent are so much alike that in the
field of tort the terms may usually be dealt with interchangeably, though there is a
clear distinction between them in other aspects.
Cf. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 2: "The words 'master' and 'servant'
are herein used to indicate the relationship from which arises the tort liability of
an employer to third persons for the tort of an employee." See also LABATT, MAS-
TER AND SERVANT (2d ed. 1913) §§ 65, 66, 67, pointing out the distinction between
servant and agent.
4. Painter v. Mayor, 46 Pa. 213 (1863); Patton v. McDonald, 204 Pa. 517
(1903); Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N. E. 279 (1891).
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such relationship may be implied from the subsequent acts and conduct of the
parties. When so implied, it is equivalent to previous authority, and results as
effectively to establish the relation of master and servant as if the agency had
been authorized ab initio.5 The doctrine is aptly expressed by the well known
maxim from the Roman Law "Ratihabitio priori mandato aequiparatur," that a
subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform
such an act.6 Ratification, then, may be defined as the affirmance by a person
of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done, or professedly done,
on his account. As a result, the act is given effect as if originally authorized
by him. 7 This affirmance may be in either express and direct, or in implied and
indirect, terms of assent,8 but it is constantly emphasized that it must be
performed with full knowledge of all the material facts.9 As to the requirement
that there be "full" knowledge of all the material- facts, Judge Sherwood, in
his dissenting opinion in Jones v. Williams,'0 aptly notes that ". . . a frac-
tion of knowledge can not beget an integer of ratification". Would, however, a
master ever ratify if he had, in fact, "full" knowledge of the tort?
The usual dogma is that in order for a master to "ratify" the unauthorized
acts of his servant, (meaning that, upon his affirmance, the original transaction
shall have the same legal consequences to the master as if it had been originally
authorized),"1 he must, as pointed out heretofore, do so with knowledge of the
facts or knowledge of the wrong.12 And in the ordinary tort case, the facts that
are material within this rule are the time, place, persons affected, nature of the
acts done, and the extent of the injury.'3 Such a statement of the requirement of
knowledge, however, is loose and leads to confusion and uncertainty. It is more
accurate to say that, except in cases in which the master intentionally ratifies
without inquiry or wilfully takes a chance on unknown facts, any ratification,
in order to be effectual, must have been made by the master with full and
complete knowledge of all pertinent facts.14 Thus, if a master approves the
conduct of an unauthorized servant without inquiry, it would not be unreasonable
to say that he has deliberately assumed the risk of lack of knowledge, and so it
has been held.15
5. Ballard v. Nye, 138 Cal. 588, 72 Pac. 156 (1903).
6. Palmer v. Yates, 5 N. Y. Super. Ct. 137, 151 (1849).
7. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 82.
8. Bell v. Scranton Trust Co., 282 Pa. 562, 128 Atl. 494 (1925).
9. Noggle Wholesale & Mfg. Co. v. Sellers & Marquis Roofing Co., 183 S. W.
659 (Mo. App. 1916); Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 132 S. C. 193, 129 S. E.
79 (1925); Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N. W. 276 (1903); Myers v. Shipley,
140 Md. 380, 116 Atl. 645 (1922).
10. 139 Mo. 1, 77 (1897).
11. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 82.
12. Rogers v. Brummett, 92 Okla. 216, 220 Pac. 362 (1923) ; Cranston v. West
Coast Life Ins. Co., 72 Ore. 116, 142 Pac. 762 (1914).
13. 1 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 397.
14. 1 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 395; Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 59 7, 97
N. W. 276 (1903); Cf. Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 At]. 645 (1922) (if a
person ratifies an act of his agent before he knows the material facts, he may
afterwards disaffirm and escape liability).
15. Kelley v. Isensee, 60 N. D. 149, 233 N. W. 245 (1930); Hutchinson Co. v.
Gould, 180 Cal. 356, 181 Pac. 651 (1919).
[Vol. 6
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In the case of Myers v. Shipley,16 the court held in a well reasoned opinion
that while the doctrine of ratification of the agent's acts applies as well to torts
as to contracts, the adoption of a tort must be "explicit" and, of course, with full
knowledge of the tort. It is not unlikely that many people feel with Mr. Justice
Holmes that it is indeed a harsh rule of law which makes a man a party to
a bare personal tort merely by assenting to it after it has been committed.1 7
This feeling, if widely held, might justify an interpretation of the word "explicit"
in such a case as a requirement that the ratification by the master of the
tortious acts of his .servant must be more direct and less ambiguous than the
ratification of a contract made by an unauthorized agent. But upon examina-
tion of the cases we find no square authority to support this interpretation.18
The distinction suggested, and possibly warranted by the use of the word
"explicit," seems in fact not to be made. Ordinarily the cases seem to de-
mand the same qualities of ratification whether in contract or in tort, and it
is sometimes specifically stated that they are to be treated alike.19
Although a corporate master was here involved, the fact is not particularly
significant since in modern law the principles as to ratification are, in general,
the same for corporations as for individuals, 20 in spite of certain early cases
such as the Ohio case of Orr v. Bank of the United States,2' which held that
since a corporation could not be sued for an assault and battery, it was incapable
of ratifying the assaults of its employees. Hence, a corporation will, generally
speaking, be liable for an injury done by its servants if under like circumstances
an individual would be responsible, and upon ratification of a servant's tortious
act, the corporation likewise becomes liable to the third party injured by servant.22
As to what acts will constitute ratification, it is usually stated that any words
or conduct showing an intention upon the part of the master to adopt the tortious
act in whole or in part as his own constitutes ratification.23 But since in no
case we have found has the master expressly ratified the tortious act of his
servant, it is necessary to limit the discussion to cases of implied ratification of
the servant's tortious acts rendering the master liable therefor.
An implied ratification is often asserted where the employer has retained
the tortfeasor in his employ. Whether such a master, who knowingly retains in
his employ a servant who has committed a tort, thereby ratifies the tort by im-
plication, is a question upon which the cases are in conflict. 24  A great many
courts have held that the retention of the servant in the employ of the
master, subsequent to the commission of the unauthorized act, is evidence of the
16. 140 Md. 380, 116 Atl. 645 (1922).
17. Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 28 N. E. 279 (1891).
18. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) §§ 82, and 218 (do not make the suggested
distinction between contract and tort).
19. O'Neil v. National Oil Co., 231 Mass. 20, 120 N. E. 107 (1918).
20. Dougherty v. Excelsior Springs, 110 Mo. App. 623, 85 S. W. 112 (1904).
21. 1 Ohio 36 (1822).
22. Nims v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177, 35 N. E. 776 (1893).
23. TIFFANY, AGENCY (2d ed. 1924) § 53; Byne v. Hatcher, 75 Ga. 289
(1885).
24. 1 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 475.
1941]
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master's ratification of the servant's unauthorized act 25 if the master has full
knowledge of the facts. 26 Especially has this been true in the cases of rail-
roads and other corporations owing a special duty to the public, where probably
because of the special duty involved, slight circumstances, such as retention of
servant in the employ of the master, have rendered the latter liable for the ser-
vant's unauthorized tortious acts. 27
The great weight of authority and the view of a leading textbook writer,
however, is that mere retention of the servant in the employ of the master does
of itself not constitute ratification, 28 nor is it alone evidence of ratification. 29
Standing alone, it is ambiguous and does not necessarily imply affirmance and
approval, but all courts agree that the retention of the servant in the employment,
when taken in connection with other circumstances, evidences a ratification of the
servant's unauthorized acts.30
As an example of the many variables which bear upon the arguable approval
of a servant's tort by his mere retention, the case of Grattan v. Suedmeyer,81
is in point. Here it was held that the act of the servant in assaulting a third
person was not ratified by the master's continuing the servant in his employ and
assisting him in the defense of the action brought by the injured third person.
In this case, however, it appeared that the master was the father of the servant,
and the court pointed out that it was only natural for the father to defend the
son and that he could not be held responsible for the tort of his son merely be-
cause he continued to treat him as a father should treat a son.
In the principle case, however, the court was faced with more than mere
retention in employ with knowledge. Not only the defense of the servant in the
police court, but also the appeal taken by the master to the circuit court from
the judgment of the police court, was conduct upon the part of the master
which was unequivocal and of such character, we believe, as to evidence clearly
an intent to ratify. If the doctrine of the ratification of a tort is to be accepted
25. Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So.
541 (1917); Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 86 P. (2d) 696 (Cal. App. 1939);
Sullivan v. People's Ice Corp., 92 Cal. App. 740, 268 Pac. 934 (1928); Pullman
Co. v. Alexander, 117 Miss. 348, 78 So. 293 (1918); McFadden v. Anderson Motor
Co., 121 S. C. 407, 114 S. E. 402 (1922) ; Cobb v. Simon, 119 Wis. 597, 97 N. W.
276 (1903); Southern Surety Co. v. Harrisburg Hospital, 253 Ill. App. 458, 461(1929).
26. Edmunds v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 174 Cal. 246, 162 Pac. 1038 (1917);
Tauscher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P. (2d) 318 (1936).
27. Perkins v. Missouri, K. & T. R. R., 55 Mo. 201 (1874) ; Graham v. Pacific
R. R., 66 Mo. 536 (1877); Pullman Co. v. Alexander, 117 Miss. 348, 78 So. 293
(1918); Bass v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 42 Wis. 654 (1877).
28. 1 MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 3, § 475; Chaney v. Frigidaire Corp., 31
F. (2d) 977 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) (assault and battery case); Kastrup v. Yellow
Cab & Baggage Co., 129 Kan. 398, 282 Pac. 742 (1929); Edmunds v. Atchinson,
T. & S. F. Ry., 174 Cal. 246, 162 Pac. 1038 (1917); Turner v. American Dist.
Tel. & Messenger Co., 94 Conn. 707, 110 Atl. 540 (1920).
29. Mann v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 132 S. C. 193, 129 S. E. 79 (1925).
30. Edmunds v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry., 174 Cal. 246, 162 Pac. 1038 (1917) ;
Da Ponte v. Ogden, 161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926); Case Threshing Mach. Co.
v. Beavers, 261 S. W. 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
31. 144 Mo. App. 719, 129 S. W. 1038 (1910).
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by our courts today, which is beyond argument, its application in the principal
case would seem to be fully warranted on the facts.
CHARLES J. MCMULLIN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS-HANDBILL ORDINANCES
Schneider v. New Jersey'
Ordinances of Los Angeles, Worcester, and Milwaukee forbade distribution
of handbills on public streets and other specified public places. An ordinance of
Irvington, New Jersey, required the acquisition of a permit from a city officer
prior to any distribution or canvass; such officer being allowed to use his dis-
cretion in granting the permit. State courts upheld these ordinances as valid
regulations of the use of the streets by preventing the littering thereof. The
Supreme Court of the United States held the ordinances invalid. "Public con-
venience in respect of cleanliness of the streets does not justify an exertion of the
police power which invades the free communication of information and opinion
secured by the Constitution."'J
Fundamentally our freedom of speech springs from the English common law
and the liberal ideas of the American Revolution.2 The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 3 is controlling over all acts done under the authority
of a municipal ordinance, as that municipal power has been conferred by the
state.4 The freedom of speech and press secured by the First Amendment of
our national Constitution against abridgment by the United States, is similarly
secured to all persons against abridgment by a state, by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument that prevention of distribution
does not affect freedom of the press has been discountenanced by the Supreme
Court's declaration that liberty of circulation is as essential as freedom of
publishing. 5 Certainly without the right to circulate, the publication would be
of little benefit to the publisher.
Decisions by the state courts in respect to "handbill ordinances" have been
varied. However, the tendency of the older cases indicates reasonable police
regulations are not to be declared invalid because they might incidentally affect
freedom of speech and the press, or other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.6
1. 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
Ia. Id. at 163.
2. Cathcart, Constitutional Freedom of Speech and of the Press (1935) 21
A. B. A. J. 595, 598.
3. U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
4. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907); Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913); Cuyahoga
River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U. S. 462 (1916).
5. In re Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1878).
6. (1917) 12 C. J. § 479: "The constitutional guaranty of free speech
does not prevent the government from regulating the use of places wholly within
its control. Thus a statute or ordinance which forbids the delivery of addresses
1941I]
5
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1941
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
As a contrast, the instant case seemingly emphasizes the individual liberties by
stating: "Although a municipality may enact regulations in the interest of the
public safety, health, welfare or convenience, these may not abridge the individual
liberties secured by the Constitution . . .'7 In the past, state courts have
upheld as valid city ordinances designed to prevent littering of the streets by
forbidding the distribution of handbills.8 Also, the frightening of horses has been
declared a valid basis for preventing distribution of such handbills.9 Annoyance of
travelers by bills blowing about has been declared a ground for validating such
regulatory ordinances. 10 Prohibition of the use of streets by persons for any
purposes detrimental to the common good have been regarded as reasonable
exercises of the police power. Dissemination of handbills has been declared
detrimental to the common good." Not only has distribution of such to passers-
by been used as a basis for these ordinances, but delivery onto porches, 12 or into
mailboxes'3 has been held violative of ordinances designed to prevent littering
of the streets. Whenever state courts have adjudged handbill ordinances invalid,
the basis for such has been an unreasonable exercise of the police power by the
in the public parks, or on the streets, or which forbids the free distribution of
printed matter on the streets, constitutes a valid exercise of the police power."
But see Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
In re Anderson, 69 Nebr. 686, 689, 96 N. W. 149, 150 (1903): "The ordinance
in question is manifestly a police regulation intended to further the public health
and safety by preventing the accumulation of large quantities of waste paper
upon the streets and alleys, which might occasion danger from fire choke up and
obstruct gutters and catch-basins, and keep the streets in an unclean and filthy
condition. A police regulation, obviously intended as such, and not operating
unreasonably beyond the occasions of its enactment, is not invalid simply because
it may affect incidentally the exercise of some right guaranteed by the constitution.
The test in such cases is whether the regulation in question is a bonca fide
exercise of the police power or an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with
the rights of individuals under the guise of police regulation. . . . It (the
ordinance) has no reference to or connection with freedom of speech or of the
press, and its plain purpose is, not to interfere with the publication of sentiments
and opinions of individuals, but to promote the cleanliness and safety of the
municipality."
Milwaukee v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N. W. 352 (1931).
7. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939).
8., People v. Horwitz, 27 Cr. R. 237, 140 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1912); Com-
monwealth v. Kimball, 13 N. E. (2d) 18 (Mass. 1938); People v. Armstrong, 73
Mich. 288, 41 N. W. 275 (1888).
9. Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 Pac. 343 (1895); Philadelphia v.
Brabender, 201 Pa. 574, 51 Atl. 374 (1902); People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288,
41 N. W. 275 (1888).
10. Commonwealth v. Kimball, 13 N. E. (2d) 18 (Mass. 1938).
11. People v. Horwitz, 27 Cr. R. 237, 243, 140 N. Y. Supp. 437, 442 (1912).
"The ordinance read: 'That no person shall throw, cast or distribute in or upon
any of the streets, avenues or public places, or in front yards or stoops, any
hand bills, circulars, cards or other advertising matter whatsoever.' . . .
I would put the constitutionality of this ordinance on the ground that a munici-
pality, through its legislative body, has the right to prohibit the use of the streets
by persons for any purposes detrimental to the common good, or that may conflict
or interfere with the rights of others in the enjoyment of the highways, which
should be unincumbered and clean, so as to promote the safety, health and comfort
of the public."
12. People v. St. John, 288 Pac. 53 (Calif. 1930).
13. Sieroty v. Huntington Park, 111 Cal. App. 377, 295 Pac. 564 (1931).
[Vol. 6
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rule-making body.14 However, these courts have looked hard to find some reason-
able exercise of police power whenever possible.
Attempts were made by the proponents of the ordinances in the principal
case to distinguish them from the unconstitutional ordinance in Lovell v. Griffln 5
There distribution was forbidden everywhere, while in the instant case only
specified public places were stipulated in which distribution was forbidden. Also
the Griffin ordinance was not primarily directed at preventing the littering of
the city streets. Yet the court in the principal case disregards these distinctions,
contending that though such might improve the cleanliness of the streets, still
such a ground is insufficient to warrant a curtailment of fundamental rights.
Freedom of speech and press are such rights, and the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects these fundamental liberties from encroachment
by state governments.'0
However, there is nothing in the decision of this court to indicate a muni-
cipality may not license the circulation of advertising matter where such distri-
bution is for the purpose of private profit. Nor does the guarantee of freedom
of speech deprive the city of power to enact regulations against throwing litera-
ture broadcast into the street. The thing declared unconstitutional is the absolute
bar on distribution of handbills as a means of preventing littering of public
streets.
Our Supreme Court has broadened the concept of freedom of speech and
press from one of mere prohibition against censorship'7 to any action by the
government restricting free and general discussion.8 For the same purpose,
the Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,19 forbade the
city to abridge the freedom of assembly. That ordinance required permits from
the chief of police in order to have public meetings in streets and other public
places. This view, however, is diametrically opposed to an earlier view of the
court in Davis v. Massachusetts.20 There an ordinance requiring a permit from
the mayor as a condition precedent to the making of public addresses on public
property, was declared valid. The basis was that no one had the right to use the
14. Chicago v. Schultz, 341 Ill. 208, 173 N. E. 276, 277 (1930): "If this
ordinance should be upheld, every person who hands his card or picture to another
while on a public street . . . will be subject to a fine. . . . The ordinance
is not a reasonable exercise of its police powers. Its strict enforcement would
unreasonably hamper persons in the conduct of their affairs." Attempts to
regulate practices of citizens without any reasonable basis for so doing.
In re Thornburg, 55 Ohio App. 229, 9 N. E. (2d) 516, 517 (1936): "This
power [police power], however, is limited and confined by the constitutional pro-
vision that the citizen shall not thereby unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without due
process of law, be deprived of his life, liberty, or property. . . . That is not
within powers of the city council to prohibit the distribution of handbills, cir-
culars, cards, or other advertising which are incident to the conduct of a lawful
business when the same have not a tendency to obstruct the free flow of traffic."
15. 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
16. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
17. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907).
18. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); 2 COonY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 886.
19. 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
20. 167 U. S. 43 (1897).
1941]
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common upon other terms than the legislature should stipulate. The decision of
the instant case likewise broadens the concept of this freedom by denying to the
municipality the right to regulate distribution of handbills in order to prevent
littering the streets. Thus it seems to be in accord with the general tendency
of the Court. This emphasis on freedom of speech and press, as opposed to state
police power, indicates an entirely new basis for examining the "handbill ordi-
nances." Because of the increasing necessity for keeping large metropolitan
streets free from trash and debris, "handbill ordinances" are of extreme im-
portance today. This decision seems to greatly limit the city's power to pass such
types of ordinances.
WILLIAM AULL, III
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CIVIL LIBERTIES--FREEuim OF RELIGION-COMPULSORY
FLAG SALUTE
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitisl
Two children were expelled from public school for refusing, for religious
reasons, 2 to salute the flag when required to do so by the local board of education.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower federal courts and denied
the injunction restraining the enforcement of its expulsion order by the board
of education.
Here we have a conflict between reverence for the flag of our country and
religious liberty. Reasoning on both of these subjects is greatly obscured by the
feeling and emotion which invariably enter in. This is especially so when the
two come in conflict, as here.
It is assumed by the Court that the Fourteenth Amendment 3 prohibits the
states from abridging religious liberties just as the National Government is
prohibited by the First Amendment. 4 In this case it is admitted that the refusal
of the children to salute the flag is based on genuine religious beliefs. However,
the Court's decision has the effect of depriving them of free schooling, because
they refuse to do an act that, according to their religion, amounts to blasphemy.
1. 310 U. S. 586 (1940), rev'g, 108 F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939), and
24 F. Supp. 271 (D. C. E. D. Pa., 1938).
2. The children were members of the sect known as "Jehovah's Witnesses,"
which believes that such a gesture of respect to the flag is forbidden by command
of scripture.
3. ". . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . ." The "liberty" in this clause has
been assumed to include the protections of the First Amendment, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925), was the first case in which
it was assumed that the liberty protected from state action by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included, among other things, the liberties
protected from national action by the First Amendment. This fact has since
been assumed universally down to the present time.
[Vol. 6
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In reaching this result, the opinion of the Court, which was written by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, does not even consider the fact, which was basic in
the decisions of the district and circuit courts, that there is no showing of any
clear and present danger 5 from the conduct of these children. In fact, doubt is
even cast on the effectiveness of the law here upheld. 6 The dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Stone makes no comment on this omission.
The reasoning in this case appears to follow the same pattern as that in
Gitlow v. New York7 In that case the Court decided that the state had power
to pass an act against criminal anarchy. The reasons in support of this were
self-preservation of the state, and other reasons much the same as in the
principal case. After the Court decided that the state had the power to pass
such a statute, and that the statute did not violate the Constitution, the Court
said that the act of the defendant came within this statute and, therefore, the
defendant was guilty, regardless of whether his personal liberty of free speech
was infringed or not. In the principal case the same line of reasoning is used.
The Court here says that the state can prescribe the conduct of its schools to
reach the designated ends, and this is such a regulation and, therefore, it is
per se constitutional. The general outlines and ends of the legislation or regula-
tion are constitutional in both cases and therefore every case that falls within
these general outlines is constitutional, no matter how much any individual's
personal liberties are encroached upon.
If freedom of religion from control or interference by the state, as sup-
posedly protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is
to have any real meaning, it would seem that only in case of actual necessity as
required by the clear and present danger test of Mr. Justice Holmes in the case
of Schenck v. United States,8 would the state be allowed to invade this freedom.
In the principal case there was no intimation that such a danger to the safety of
the country was even remotely involved.
Recognizing that the judiciary should not concern itself with the wisdom or
policy of regulatory measures, the Court, in the principal case, refused to consider
whether this regulation reaches the desired result or not, saying: "But the
courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy .......
So to hold would in effect make us the school board for the country." 9  The
reasoning seems to be, like that in the Gitlow case, that the state has a right
to regulate its schools, this is such a regulation, and the Court will not look into
5. This clear and present danger test was put forward by Mr. Justice
'Holmes in connection with freedom of speech in the case of Schenck v. United
States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919), where he says: "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." This test was also contended for
in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States,
250 U. S. 616, 628 (1919) and Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 672 (1925),
and was apparently reaffirmed in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937).
6. 310 U. S. 586, 597 (1940).
7. 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
8. 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919). See note 2, supra.
9. 310 U. S. 586, 598 (1940).
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the detailed operation to see if it in fact infringes upon the constitutionally
protected freedom or not.
Other cases in this same general field of civil liberties do not refuse to look
at the actual working of the questioned statute to see if there is in fact any
infringement of the liberties protected by the Constitution. In the case of
Schneider v. New Jersey,'0 Mr. Justice Roberts, in his opinion for the Court,
said: "In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged
legislation. 1" The Court then says that legislative judgment may be its own
justification in the case of ordinary regulatory measures, but not where the con-
stitutional rights of the people are abridged, and continues: "And so, as cases
arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circum-
stances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of
the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. '12 In the case of Cantwell v.
Connecticut,3 Mr. Justice Roberts, again speaking for the Court, says: "Thus
the (Fourteenth) Amendment embraces two concepts,-freeddm to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute . . . but the second cannot be. Con-
duct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.14  . . . In
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.""' The Court then
goes on to say that the regulation in this case unduly infringes on the freedom
of religion and finds no reason why the Court cannot look into the actual oper-
ation of the statute in question to reach this result.16
In defense of this refusal to look at the facts, the opinion in the principal
case says: "Except where the transgression of constitutional liberty is too plain
for argument, personal freedom is best maintained-so long as the remedial
channels of the democratic process remain open and unobstructed-when it is
ingrained in a people's habits. ."17 This would seem to contend that
the political arena, and not the courts, is the place where the weak and the few
are to seek enforcement of their constitutional rights. This statement is made
in the face of the fact that the plaintiffs are members of a numerically small
and politically impotent group that cannot secure its own relief through the
public forum but must rely upon the courts to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution that were designed to protect them from just such oppressive laws.
Mr. Justice Stone, in his dissent, has this to say on the subject: "History teaches
10. 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
11. Id. at 161.
12. Ibid.
13. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
14. This was early decided in respect to Congress and the First Amendment
in the case of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1878). Even here it
was realized that acts defended on religious grounds could only be regulated
when they were "actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."
15. 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
16. The court held that requirement of a permit to solicit funds for re-
ligious organizations was unconstitutional.
17. 310 U. S. 586, 599 (1940).
[Vol. 6
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1941], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss1/10
RECENT CASES
us that there have been but few infringements of personal liberty by the state
which have not been justified, as they are here, in the name of righteousness
and the public good, and few which have not been directed, as they are now,
at politically helpless minorities."' 8
The dissenting opinion goes on to point out that: "This seems to me no more
than the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small
minorities to the popular will."'19 It then states that it is doubtful if the act in
question is effective to achieve the end at which it was aimed-the promotion of
loyalty to, and love of, our country. Where governmental regulation and per-
sonal liberties conflict, it is the function of the courts to accommodate the two,
and such regulation is not important enough to warrant the breach of liberty
involved in it. Government cannot, as a mere educational measure, force children
by public affirmation to violate their religious conscience. The most important
part of the constitutional guarantee of civil liberties is freedom from compulson
in what the individual will say. This is especially so when such compulsion
would force that individual to bear false witness to his religion.
This case recognizes and approves the end desired to be reached by this
regulation. That end is, in the last analysis, the preservation of the state. To
do this the state here takes this means of instilling loyalty to the government
in the hearts of the school children and thus attempts to counteract the many
influences at large in the world today that work against the democratic form
of government and all that our country stands for. The same end was in view
in the laws questioned by the cases of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,20 and Meyer
v. Nebraska.21 In both of these cases the law was passed to help in the Amer-
icanization of children of foreign extraction who were reared in a foreign
atmosphere and regularly conversed in a foreign language. The Washington
statute, declared unconstitutional in the Pierce case, dealt with the situation by
requiring all children to go to public schools. The Nebraska statute, invalidated
in the Meyer case, prohibited teaching of any foreign language to pupils below
the eighth grade.
The Court overturned the statute in the Pierce case on the ground that it
infringed the property rights of private schools, and in the Meyer case on the
ground that the liberty of a foreign language teacher was interfered with:
both as contravening the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In doing so Mr. Justice McReynolds, for the Court in the Meyer case, said:
"That the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to improve the
quality of its citizens . . . is clear; but the individual has certain funda-
mental rights which must be respected. The protection of the Constitution ex-
tends to all . . . a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.1 22
In these cases the Court relied upon the due process clause in its indefinite
and uncertain meaning as a protection of property and contract rights, while
18. Id. at 604.
19. Id. at 606.
20. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
21. 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
22. Id. at 401.
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in the principal case its protective force has all of the explicitness of the
specific prohibition in favor of religious freedom contained in the First Amend-
ment. In both cases the end to be achieved is substantially the same. It there-
fore becomes a bit difficult to reconcile the present case with its predecessors,
unless the protection of property interests is more jealously guarded against
state action than is religious freedom.
Thus it is that the majority of the Court approves the expulsion of these
children if they refuse to salute the flag. If the father does not have the
money for private schooling, as is the case here, what is to happen to the
children? Pennsylvania has a compulsory school law.23  Will the children be
put in a reformatory or other institution for not attending some school? This
was the solution reached in Massachusetts. 24 It is not religious freedom when
the child is faced with the alternative of committing the sacrilegious act or
going to a reformatory.
New Jersey has gone one step further. It has enacted a law25 making it a
misdemeanor for anyone to influence a school pupil against saluting the flag.
It is very probable that some cases may arise from this statute. If so it would
seem that the Gitlow case would be direct authority for sustaining the statute.
The Supreme Court in the principal case has decided that the flag salute can
be required and the state can use reasonable means to secure the salute. Thus
the law is good and anyone who violates it is guilty as provided. This not only
follows the authority of the Gitlow case, but also the line of reasoning used
in it. Thus by following precedent it is conceivable that the courts could reach
the conclusion that the state can prosecute either a parent for teaching his child
this religion or any other member of the sect, if not the sect itself as an
organization. It is hard to see how this could be called religious freedom. It
would rather be persecution.
This flag salute law is not the only method by which the desired ends can
be achieved. While it is admitted that the state has a choice of means to an end
(and these are laudable ends) in the regulation of the everyday affairs of man,
it seems that when the means selected infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom, this freedom should prevail over the selection of the legislature.
It is pleasing to note that in one instance a more rational solution has been
applied to the problem here under consideration. It was noted in the press
recently 28 that Judge Moore of Pontiac, Michigan, had suggested that a pledge
of allegiance to the United States itself be used rather than the salute to the
flag. This was accepted by both sides in Rochester, Minnesota, where nineteen
children had been expelled for refusal to salute the flag, and now all of the
children are back in school. While this does not dispose of the legal question
23. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 24, § 1421.
24. (1939) 24 MASS. L. Q., April-June, p. 4; July-September, p. 1.
25. N. J. Laws 1939, c. 65: "Any person, corporation, society or organization
who or which shall influence or attempt to influence any school pupil in this
State against the salute to the flag of the United States of America by instruction
printed or otherwise shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
26. Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, November 13, 1940.
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involved, it is a very sensible and practical solution and prevents much dis-
comfort and hardship on all sides.
From the foregoing discussion it would seem reasonable to conclude that
there should be a return to the clear and present danger test laid down by
Mr. Justice Holmes if the constitutional provision protecting freedom of religion




There are a number of associated rules dealing with restraints on alienation.
The rule against perpetuities provides that any interest which might vest- more
remotely than lives in being and twenty-one years is invalid. 2 An example of this
would be: A to B and his heirs, but if St. Pauls' falls, then to C and his heirs.
The rule against the suspension of the power of alienation deals with direct
restraints either of a disability type, or of a forfeiture type. Even though the
restraint is limited in time, generally any direct restraint against alienation is
void.3 An example of this is to be found where the creating instrument directs
that the grantee of a fee simple absolute shall not alienate.
A third rule limits the duration of indestructible trusts.4 Presumably a
trust made for an indefinite period of years can be terminated by an adult
beneficiary at the end of lives in being and twenty-one years. An example here
would be a trust to continue during, and for two years after, the administration
of the testator's estate.
A recent District of Columbia case has raised the related problem as to
whether any common law rule limits accumulations of income. The historic case
where thid problem is first dramatically presented is Thellusson v. Woodford,5
decided in 1799. There the testator, an English merchant, left over £600,000
in trust for the lives of his then living descendants, including grandchildren.
The income was to be accumulated, and on the death of the last surviving descen-
dant there was to be a division between the three eldest male descendants of his
three sons. The court reluctantly sustained the trust. Apparently it did so
because the postponement of the vesting of a future interest for a like period was
permissible under the rule against perpetuities. Actuarial computations in-
dicated that these lives could not be expected to terminate in less than from
seventy to eighty-five years and it appeared that the accumulation would amount
to £30,000,000. Such a sum would exhaust all the land available in England for
1. 33 F. Supp. 921 (App. D. C. 1940).
2. GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3rd ed. 1915) § 201.
3. 2 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) § 451.
4. Id. at § 589; Note (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 361.
5. 11 Ves. 112 (Ch. 1805).
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investment. Immediately there was a storm of protest which resulted the next
year in the Thellusson Act.6 This act permitted accumulations for only four
periods, namely, for the life of the donor, for twenty-one years after the donor's
death, for the minorities of any persons living at the donor's death, or for the
minorities of persons who would be entitled to the income of the fund if no
provision for accumulation were made. This act is not a part of our American
common law, as it was adopted in England after the Revolutionary War. A
number of states, however, have statutes modeled after the English Thellusson
Act.7
If the beneficial interest in a trust for accumulation is contingent, obviously
the rule against perpetuities applies. If the beneficial interest is vested but the
accumulation extends beyond the permissible period under the rule against per-
petuities the answer is not so clear.
There are American cases holding that an accumulation for a period shorter
than lives in being and twenty-one years is valid.8 A Missouri case has sustained
an accumulation for one life.9 In that case the trustee was to care for the
grantor for life during which there was to be an accumulation. On grantor's
death the trust was to be for the benefit of others but without an accumulation.
The court said no violation of the rule restricting accumulations was involved.
We have a United States Supreme Court holding that an accumulation for
lives in being and twenty-one years is valid.10 However the importance of this
decision as American authority is slight because the court seems to assume that
the law of Hawaii was the common law of England "declared in the Judiciary
Act of 1892 to be in force here (in Hawaii)." Certainly the Thellusson case
was a part of the English common law before that date.
Several American cases assert by way of dicta that an accumulation must
not extend longer than the permissible period under the rule against perpe-
tuities-that is, lives in being and twenty-one years.11 Further we have decisions
6. 39 & 40 Geo. III, c. 98 (1800).
7. ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 6914; ARIz. Rnv. CODE ANN. (Struck-
meyer, 1928) § 2773; CAL. CIV. CODE (Chase, 1935), §§ 722-726; ILL. REV. STAT.
ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 30, § 153; IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) § 13222;
MIcH. COMP. LAWs (1929) §§ 12956-12960; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§ 8066,
8067; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 6711, 6712;
N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW (Consol. Laws, c. 50) § 61, as amended by Laws
1915, c. 670, § 1; PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW N. Y. (Consol. Laws, c. 41) as amended
by Laws 1915, c. 670, Laws 1927, cc. 384, 681, Laws 1928, c. 172; N. D. ComvP.
LAws ANN. (1913) §§ 5290-5294; PA. 20 PS. § 3251; Public Laws of 1853, 503, § 9,
as amended by Public Laws of 1931, No. 27, § 1; S. D. CODE §§ 51.0302-51.0306;
Wis. STAT. (1937) §§ 230.36-230.38.
8. Moeller v. Kautz, 112 Conn. 481, 152 At. 886 (1930); Melvin v. Hoffman,
290 Mo. 464, 235 S. W. 107 (1921).
9. Ibid.
10. Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U. S. 321 (1908).
11. See Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446. 452 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1910);
Hoadley v. Beardsley, 89 Conn. 270, 271, 93 At. 535, 539 (1915); Moeller v.
Kautz, 112 Conn. 481, 488, 152 Atl. 886, 888 (1930) ; Wilson v. D'Atro, 109 Conn.
563, 567, 145 Atl. 161, 163 (1929); Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 450,
48 N. E. 561, 566 (1897) ; Kasey v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 Ky. 609, 623, 115 S. W.
739, 742 (1909); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541, 547, 50 Atl. 898, 900 (1901);
Melvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 499, 235 S. W. 107, 116 (1921).
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which hold accumulations in excess of lives in being and twenty-one years in-
valid,12 but these cases may be explained on the alternative ground that the
beneficial interest was limited on a contingency which might occur more remotely
than lives in being and twenty-one years, hence the limitations violated the rule
against perpetuities.
In Missouri we have what may be a holding contrary to the dicta above to
the effect that an accumulation must not extend longer than the permissible
period under the rule against perpetuities. 13 The court stated that as the
"title to the property out of which the income arises is vested, the rule limiting
accumulations has no application." If this were literally true, an accumulation,
if vested, might extend for one thousand years or indefinitely. Certainly if the
court had not gone against the express language of the testator there would have
been an accumulation for longer than the permissible period-that is, lives in
being and twenty-one years. But, as construed, these accumulations were to
terminate within the permissible period. Hence this can hardly be a holding
that an accumulation of indefinite duration would be valid. It is clear, however,
that the Missouri court goes as far as any authority in rejecting the policy of the
English Thellusson Act-that is, the Missouri court seems to favor accumulations.
The case under discussion, a recent Federal District Court case from the
District of Columbia, presents a very sharp break in the authority. Testator
set up a trust to be effective for twenty-one years after the death of two named
nieces. Accumulations of income after payment of annuities were to be re-
invested in the fund and the aggregate turned over to the issue of testator's five
nieces per stirpes. , According to the court the accumulation would last for a
period probably in excess of sixty years and would increase from a sum of
approximately $2,000,000 to approximately $12,000,000. After disposing of the
question of any possible violation of the rule against perpetuities or the rule
against restraints on alienation, the court holds the direction for the accumulation
invalid. In order to keep from being bound by Fitchie v. Brown, the court dealt
12. Girard Trust Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1910); Wilson
v. D'Atro, 109 Conn. 563, 145 Atl. 161 (1929); Andrews v. Lincoln, 95 Me. 541,
50 At. 898 (1901).
13. Trautz v. Lemp, 329 Mo. 580, 46 S. W. (2d) 135 (1932). The facts were
that the testator devised the residue of his property to trustees for the benefit
of named beneficiaries, children of the testator, the trust to "commence immediately
on the termination of the administration of my estate." In the event of the death
of the named beneficiaries, the trust was to be administered in favor of what the
court construed to mean the children of any such beneficiary. The trust was
to "continue for a period of twenty years from its beginning." The court con-
strued the instrument contrary to the express direction of the testator that the
trust was to commence at the termination of administration, and held the trust
commenced at the testator's death, in order to satisfy the rule of law that a trust
must come into existence on the effective date of the instrument creating it.
It then proceeded to state that both equitable and legal title were vested at testa-
tor's death, the trust was to extend but twenty years, and consequently there
was no violation of the rule against perpetuities. Otherwise there would have
been a violation because of the unpredictable period of time required for ad-
ministration. A sizable portion of the dividends from the trust property were
undisposed of. The court then makes its statement that the rule limiting accumula-
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with the problem of "reception" of the common law. It pointed out that the com-
mon law of England as of 1892, which was adopted in Hawaii, is not necessarily
the common law of England applicable to the District of Columbia. The District
of Columbia received its law from Maryland which received the common law as of
1776.14
The court was then justified in the absence of "controlling" precedent in
deciding what was the common law by judicial legislation. But it goes even
farther. It states that the "common law insofar as it permits accumulations
of the character in this suit," is "obsolete and repugnant to our conditions," "in-
consistent with the principles of democracy," and aristocratic. In short, it
recognizes that it is turning over what is probably our common law authority.
Certainly there seems to be social desirability in not allowing property to be
tied up unduly without being of beneficial use to anyone. The court is strength-
ened in view of the fact that the English Thellusson Act was passed for similar
reasons. It does not seem desirable that our courts should follow a policy of the
English common law of 1799 which has been so greatly modified by later English
legislation. Although the court seems to have a dislike for accumulations in
general, the direct holding of the case can be little more than: "Under the
particular circumstances . . . the provision in respect of accumulations
involving as it does the inalienable accumulation of a huge sum of money,
probably $10,000,000 for a period probably in excess of sixty years, is invalid."
No doubt the court was influenced somewhat in its decision by the size of the
accumulation. It must be remembered that this is a common law decision and
that another accumulation of shorter duration and involving less money might
consistently be sustained.
We have the Missouri decision and the District of Columbia decision repre-
senting the two divergent views. It would appear that in case the opportunity
arose, the Missouri court would do well to re-examine its position in view of the
fact that the Missouri decision dealt with a limitation which, as construed, would
not extend beyond the permissible period.
Under the doctrine of the Claflin case,'r which is followed in a considerable
number of jurisdictions, courts will give effect to a provision that a trust shall
be indestructible for a given period *of time. A provision for indestructibility
would probably be held ineffective if the period is in excess of the permissible
period under the rule against perpetuities. This rule is one of application to
trusts in general. Presumably a trust made for one thousand years could be
terminated by an adult beneficiary at the end of lives in being and twenty-one
years.. It would seem, therefore, that this rule should apply to trusts for ac-
14. MD. CONST. art. V. It is very difficult to say what the common law of
England, applicable to America, is. Some courts say the adoption of the common
law meant the adoption of it as an indivisible whole. Others say it meant the
adoption as of some particular date, so that English cases prior to that time be-
came binding on the courts in this country. An even more difficult problem is
to determine what principles of the common law the courts may consider applicable
to conditions existing in this country.
15. Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889)j
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cumulation. This is especially so in view of the fact that in a trust for
accumulation both income and principal are tied up rather than principal alone.
Of course this rule will have no effect on cases falling within the permissible
period, but it does seriously limit the statement in Trautz V. Lemp that if the
interest from which an accumulation arises is vested there need be no compliance
with the usual permissible period.
JOSEPH HARDY
INSURANCE-WAIVER AND ESTOPPEL
Longo v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.1
Defendant company, through its local manager and local agent, solicited
the plaintiff to take out a policy of life insurance upon his wife. Plaintiff
answered that he doubted her eligibility because she had been in the hospital
for tuberculosis. The agents assured him it would be all right since the wife
was an arrested case. The agents asked the wife some questions and filled out
the application themselves. The insured signed it, not knowing that the local
manager had inserted false answers to the questions whether insured had ever
been in a hospital or had been treated for tuberculosis. The wife was in good
physical condition at the time the policy was taken out, but she later contracted
a cold which brought back her tuberculous condition, which in turn caused
her death. Defendant company contends the policy is void because of false and
fraudulent representations made by the wife in answering the questions in the
application, and also by reason of the breach of the sound health provision. The
court held that if the defendant's own agents intentionally wrote answers in
the application which they knew were false, then it necessarily followed that
the defendant waived the right to forfeit because of the falsity of the answers.
The majority of the American courts, in accord with the present case, hold
that if the insured gives true answers to the questions asked in the applica-
tion, but the agent enters false answers therein, the company is not discharged
from liability.2 But the question is, upon what grounds? Do the cases use the
doctrine of waiver, do they rely on the basis of estoppel, or do they distinguish
between the two doctrines at all?
In this most confused field of insurance law, many of the cases in this
country use the terms waiver and estoppel synonymously under such circum-
stances,3 and some courts have expressly held that there is no distinction in
1. 142 S. W. (2d) 871 (Mo. App. 1940).
2. North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Trenton, 99 S. W. 740 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1907); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 98 Ill. 324 (1881);
Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Leon, 138 Ind. 636, 37 N. E. 584 (1894); Smith
v. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees, 187 Minn. 202, 244 N. W. 817 (1932).
3. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 203 U. S. 106
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theory.4 Even some of our best known writers fail to recognize a difference
between the two doctrines and say: "Any unequivocal and positive act by the
insurers recognizing the policy as valid and inconsistent with the notion that
the company proposes to avail itself of a breach . . constitutes a waiver of
all known grounds of forfeiture, and the company is said to be estopped from
setting them up in defense.' 5 Other opinions on similar situations, however,
expressly state that there is a clear distinction between waiver and estoppel.0
In some of the cases in this country all evidence of waiver or estoppel under
circumstances similar to those in the present case is excluded by a strict applica-
tion of the parol evidence rule.7 Some courts expressly deny the existence of
waivers in insurance policies, arguing that any rights which may be as-
serted must be by way of estoppel to deny the existence of the contract and not
upon the theory of waiver of an alleged right to forfeit.8 It has been suggested
that the term waiver be absolutely abolished, as it is so misleading, and that
the word "election" be substituted in its place.9 Professor Williston lists at
least nine legal relationships to which the term waiver is indifferently applied,
which shows the loose use of the term.10
The Missouri cases also seem uncertain as to the reasons for holding in
favor of the insured under circumstances similar to those in the present case.
In Roberts v. American National Assurance Co.,11 the court expressly states that
"waiver and estoppel are by no means synonymous," but it does not explain
what the distinction is. Some Missouri cases simply state the rule that an
insurer cannot avoid payment on the ground of false answers when the facts
were stated to the agent who filled out the application without indicating
whether their basis is waiver or estoppel. 2 A typical example of such a case is
Sappington v. Central Mutual Insurance Ass'n,13 in which the court says that
when the agent fills out the application, the statements must be taken as state-
ments of the insurer and not the insured and that the agent's knowledge is
imputed to the insurer. Other Missouri cases involving similar situations use
the term estoppel by saying: "In such a situation the insurer is estopped from
asserting the falsity of the answers."' 4 Still other cases, like the present case,
use the term "waiver," saying that the insured waived the right of forfeiture
4. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Grove, 215 Ill. 299, 74 N. E. 141 (1905).
5. RICHARDS, INSURANCE LAW (3d ed. 1909) § 134.
6. Draper v. Oswego County Fire Relief Ass'n, 190 N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755
(1907) ; Metcalf v. Phenix Ins. Co., 21 R. I. 307, 43 Atl. 541 (1899).
7. Northern Assurance Co. v. Grand View Bldg. Ass'n, 183 U. S. 308
(1902); Deming Inv. Co. v. Shawnee Fire Ins. Co., 16 Okla. 1, 83 Pac. 918 (1905).
8. Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W. 242 (1920);
Hopkins v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 41 Wash. 592, 83 Pac. 1019 (1906).
9. Ewart, Waiver in Insurance Cases (1905) 18 HARv. L. REv. 364.
10. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 679.
11. 220 S. W. 996 (Mo. App. 1920).
12. Bever v. Home Ins. Co., 141 Mo. App. 589, 125 S. W. 1184 (1901);
Snyder v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 196 S. W. 1022 (Mo. App. 1917).
13. 229 Mo. App. 222, 77 S. W. (2d) 140 (1934).
14. Modern Woodmen of America v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W.
297 (1907); Rissler v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 150 Mo. 366, 51 S. W. 755 (1899).
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when the agent wrote in the answers falsely.' 5 In other Missouri cases, the
court uses both the terms estoppel and waiver in the same case.' 6 The parol
evidence rule is avoided by the assertion, "Notwithstanding the rule that parol
evidence is inadmissible to vary a written contract, insured may show by
parol that the answers to the questions in his application for insurance were not
written by him, and that he did not actually know the contents of the applica-
tion when he signed it."'1
The cases and authorities which' make a distinction between waiver and
estoppel seem on firmer ground. Their position is well stated in Metcalf v.
Phenix Insurance Co.:18 "A waiver arises by the intentional relinquishment of
a right by a person or party, or by his neglect to insist upon his right at the
proper time, and does not imply any conduct or dealing with another by which
that other is induced to act or forbear to his disadvantage; while an estoppel
necessarily presupposes some such conduct or dealing." Professor Vance
makes the distinction by saying: "Waiver is thus seen to be conventional in its
nature resting upon agreement, while estoppel is tortious in quality, being
grounded on deceit, or, at least, upon conduct known, or which should be
known, to be misleading. A waiver is recognized to give effect to the intention of
the party waiving, while an estoppel is enforced to defeat the inequitable intent
of the party estopped."'19 Vance points out that the parol evidence rule is not
violated by the use of equitable estoppel because the parol testimony rule has
no application in a court of equity or to the establishment of equitable remedies
even though they be claimed in legal proceedings.
In the case at hand, the Missouri court held that the defendant company
waived the right to forfeit because of the false answers in the policy. But can
it be said that the company intentionally and knowingly relinquished the
requirement that the answers in the application be truthful? This depends upon
whether or not the local manager had the authority to waive. The court in
the instant case seems to think that he did have such authority. If that is so,
then there was a waiver within the true meaning of the word, because the com-
pany, through its agent acting within his authority, must have intentionally con-
sented to the relinquishment of its right to forfeit. However, if the agent did
not have the authority to waive, and such authority in soliciting agents is rare,
it would be absurd to say that the company intended to abandon its right to
forfeit. Furthermore, its seems that the parol evidence rule would clearly be
violated by allowing outside evidence that the terms inserted in the integrated
contract were not the ones actually intended to govern the rights of the parties.
If the case is decided under the equitable doctrine of estoppel, the parol evidence
rule has no application. Here the company through its agent committed a
15. Coleman v. Central Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 52 S. W. (2d) 22 (Mo. App. 1932).
16. Ormsby v. Laclede Farmers' Mut. Fire & Lightning Ins. Co., 98 Mo.
App. 371, 72 S. W. 139 (1903).
17. Modern Woodmen of America v. Angle, 127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297
(1907).
18. 21 R. I. 307, 43 At. 541 (1899).
19. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) §§ 127-130.
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tortious act of deceit by misleading the insured. The defendant falsely repre-
sented that the policy was good and the insured reasonably relied on this false
representation. The insured, had the court not allowed the evidence as to the
true answers to come in, would have been prejudiced by the tortious deceit
of the company, in that she would have mistakenly believed herself to be ade-
quately protected under the policy. To this sort of situation the equitable doc-
trine of estoppel should be applied in preference to the doctrine of consensual
waiver which would violate the parol evidence rule.
Though the Missouri cases are confused in their reasoning, they do reach a
fair result. The Missouri case of Coleman v. Caldwell County Mutual Fire In-
surance Co.,20 expresses the true feelings of the court in such cases. "Forfei-
tures are not favorites of the law. Courts struggle against their enforcement"21
PAUL MARGOLIS, JR.
TORTS-HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE-POSITION OF IMMINENT PERIL
Roach v. Kansas City Public Service Co.1
The plaintiff's husband stood in the street beside the defendant's bus, which
was standing still with the door closed. He rapped upon the door to signal to
the defendant's driver that he wished to enter the bus. Ignoring his signal, the
driver started the bus forward and, because of ice on the street, the bus swerved
into the plaintiff's husband, knocking him down and causing him the injuries
from which he died. The case was submitted on the humanitarian doctrine.
The court instructed the jury, in effect, that in order for the plaintiff to recover
under the doctrine, it would be necessary for them to find that at the instant
the bus started forward the plaintiff's husband was in a position of imminent
peril and not in a position of safety, and that the term "imminent peril" meant
a place where there was certain danger and not a place where there was a mere
possibility of an injury occurring. From a judgment for the defendant, the
plaintiff brought a writ of error based on this instruction. Held: judgment
affirmed.
The plaintiff hardly could have contended that the position of her husband,
as he stood beside the bus while the bus remained motionless, was a position of
imminent peril as that expression has been defined by this court. 2 The case of
20. 125 Mo. App. 643, 103 S. W. 150 (1907).
21. For a good discussion of the whole above subject see, Notes (1908) 16
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1165.
1. 141 S. W. (2d) 800 (Mo. 1940).
2. The expression "imminent peril" was defined by White, J., in Banks v.
Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 273, 257 S. W. 482, 486 (1924), as follows: "That does
not mean remote, uncertain, contingent, nor (for the person affected) avoidable
danger. It is imminent, immediately impending; it admits of no time for deliber-
ation on the part of the person in peril between its appearance and the impend-
ing calamity." This definition was quoted with approval in Huckleberry v.
20
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State ex rel. Vulgamott v. Trmble,3 illustrates how such a contention probably
would have been treated if it had been made. In that case, the plaintiff engaged
one of the defendant's freight cars. He divided the car into two parts by
erecting a partition in the center thereof. The plaintiff rode in one part of the
car, as thus divided by the partition, and placed his horses in the other part.
Because of the negligence of the defendant's servants in stopping the car too
quickly, one of the horses was thrown through the partition upon the plaintiff.
The case was submitted on the humanitarian doctrine, the plaintiff contending
that he was in a position of imminent peril while he was riding in the freight
car. The court, in denying recovery under the doctrine, said of the plaintiff's
position: "It was not a safe place to ride, but his position was not so perilous
as to bring it within the humanitarian rule. As said, supra, we must have
imminent danger or peril to invoke such rule. . . The word 'peril'
means something more than a bare possibility of an injury occurring."4
In the instant case, as though in anticipation of a contention by the plaintiff
that the position of her husband, as he stood beside the motionless bus, was one
of imminent peril, the court, in the course of its opinion, used this language:
"This court has now settled the proposition that there is no humanitarian case
(and no humanitarian negligence) until the person involved is in a position of
imminent peril. . . This is because no duty to act under the humanitarian
rule arises merely if such person may soon be in, or is approaching, or is about
to come into a position of imminent peril."5
However, the plaintiff did not make such a contention.6 What the plaintiff
in the instant case did contend was that, although her husband might not have
been in a position of imminent peril at the very instant the bus started forward,
still humanitarian negligence could be found on the theory that he might
thereafter by the movement of the bus on its swinging course (due to slipping
on the icy street) have been in peril.7 To this proposition the court replied:
"What plaintiff's contention amounts to is that it was humanitarian negligence
to start the bus because the driver should have anticipated that it might slip
on the icy street after it began to move and that, if it did, plaintiff might there-
after be in a position of imminent peril. Thus, plaintiff contends that there
was humanitarian negligence herein before there was a position of imminent
Missouri Pac. R. R., 324 Mo. 1025, 26 S. W. (2d) 980 (1930); Baker v. Wood,
142 S. W. (2d) 83 (Mo. 1940).
3. 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W. 1014 (1923).
4. Id. at 109, 253 S. W. at 1019.
5. Roach v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 800, 802 (Mo.
1940).
6. This language of the instant case is contra to the case of Perkins v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 340 Mo. 868, 877, 102 S. W. (2d) 915, 919 (1937). In the
Perkins case the court held that the defendant's duty arose when the plaintiff
t. . was about to go into a position of imminent peril. . . ." The Perkins
case seems to have been overruled by Buehler v. Festus Merc. Co., 343 Mo. 139,
119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938); Kick v. Franklin, 342 Mo. 715, 137 S. W. (2d) 512
(1939); Hilton v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 137 S. W. (2d) 520 (Mo. 1940); State
ex rel. Snider v. Shain, 137 S. W. (2d) 527 (Mo. 1940).
7. Roach v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 141 S. W. (2d) 800, 802 (Mo. 1940).
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peril, which is a complete misconception of the fundamental basis of the
humanitarian rule."8
The plaintiff's theory would make the humanitarian doctrine applicable when
the plaintiff was in a situation such that, while not in imminent peril absent the
negligent act of the defendant, he was in imminent peril if such act were com-
mitted. This was held to be the law by this court in at least two cases. 9 How-
ever, these two cases, and the plaintiff's contention in the instant case, overlook
the basic elements of the humanitarian doctrine.
The position of imminent peril is the basic fact of the humanitarian
doctrine.10 No duty arises under the doctrine unless and until a position of
peril comes into existence." When such a position of peril does arise, the
doctrine seizes upon the situation as it then exists and requires the defendant to
use ordinary care with the means at hand to avert the impending injury.12
If after the position of peril has arisen, the defendant cannot, by the use of
ordinary care and with the means at hand, avert the injury, he is not liable
under the doctrine. 3
Ridge v. Jones,14 in which the two cases referred toxt were discussed, pre-
sented the identical problem to the court which the instant case presents. The
facts in that case were: The plaintiff, after alighting from his car, stood in the
8. Ibid.
9. Bobos v. Krey Packing Co., 317 Mo. 108, 117, 296 S. W. 157, 161 (1927).
The plaintiff climbed upon the step of the defendant's truck. The driver started
the truck so violently and suddenly that the plaintiff was thrown under the
wheels. In allowing recovery under the humanitarian doctrine, the court said:
"As to this it is sufficient to say that 'perilous position' as used in defining and
applying the 'humanitarian rule' is a relative term. The position of plaintiff
while in the act of climbing onto the truck, considered with reference to its
standing still, or moving slowly, was no doubt a comparatively safe one, but with
reference to the truck's being 'suddenly and violently started forward' it was
extremely perilous. There was therefore a 'present existence' of plaintiff's
perilous position before the driver started the truck."
Huckleberry v. Missouri Pac. R. R., 324 Mo. 1025, 1034, 26 S. W. (2d) 980,
984 (1930). The defendant had turned over one of its tank cars causing gasoline
to be spilled along its track. Deceased was standing beside the track when the
defendant started its engine causing sparks to be emitted therefrom which
ignited the gasoline and burned deceased. The court held that the plaintiff made
a case under the humanitarian rule: "So in the instant case, it may be said that
the position of deceased in the absence of fire was a comparatively safe one, but
in the presence of fire it was extremely perilous. When defendant operated its
engine so near that sparks and coals of fire therefrom could fall into the gasoline
and vapor surrounding the deceased, as the evidence here shows, his peril was
imminent, that is, certain, immediate and impending."
10. Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482 (1924) ; State ex rel.
Vulgamott v. Trimble, 300 Mo. 92, 253 S. W. 1014 (1923); Baker v. Wood, 142
S. W. (2d) 83 (Mo. 1940).
11. State ex rel. Fleming v. Bland, 322 Mo. 565, 15 S. W. (2d) 798 (1929);
Buehler v. Festus Mere. Co., 343 Mo. 139, 119 S. W. (2d) 961 (1938); Hilton v.
Terminal R. R. Ass'n, 137 S. W. (2d) 520 (Mo. 1940); State ex rel. Snider v.
Shain, 137 S. W. (2d) 527 (Mo. 1940).
12. State ex rel. Fleming v. Bland, 322 Mo. 565, 15 S. W. (2d) 798 (1929);
Bumgardner v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 340 Mo. 521, 102 S. W. (2d) 594 (1936).
13. Harlan v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. Ry., 64 Mo. 480 (1877); Massman v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 119 S. W. (2d) 833 (Mo. 1938); Clifford v. Pitcairn,
131 S. W. (2d) 508 (Mo. 1939).
14. 335 Mo. 219, 71 S. W. (2d) 713 (1934).
15. See note 9, supra.
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icy street very close to its side. The defendant's driver started the car with
such suddenness that it swerved into the plaintiff and knocked him down. The
contentions of the parties were stated by the court thus: "The only peril that
menaced plaintiff was created by the same negligent act of defendant's driver
which immediately and without time or opportunity for further action on the
driver's part produced the injury. Appellant argues that his negligence under
the humanitarian rule must be measured by his acts after the car started and that
if the driver negligently started the car as claimed by the plaintiff it constituted
primary negligence, entitling him to the benefit of his claim that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, but was not negligence under the humanitarian rule.
Respondent contends that, if he was in a position such that to start the car in
the manner in which his evidence shows it was started would place him in
imminent peril and likely injure him and the driver so knew or should have
known before he started the car the humanitarian rule applies even though the
same negligent act created the imminent peril and immediately produced the
injury."16 The decision of the court was that the humanitarian doctrine was
not applicable and that the case should have been tried on the theory of primary
negligence.
Phillips v. Henson1' further illustrates the doctrine which the court is pro-
pounding in cases of this type. In that case, the plaintiff was riding a motor-
cycle westward. The defendant was driving a truck eastward. When the
defendant reached the intersection of a north and south street, he suddenly
and without any warning turned left across the path of the plaintiff, striking him.
The plaintiff sought to submit the case on the humanitarian doctrine. The court
said: "Defendant owed plaintiff no duty under the humanitarian rule until he
saw or by the exercise of the highest degree of care could have seen him in a
position of peril and either oblivious thereto or unable to extricate himself.
Plaintiff was not in peril until the truck turned to the left. Defendant's act in
turning the truck without giving a signal or warning of his intention so to do,
might have been primary negligence, but it was not negligence under the human-
itarian rule, because plaintiff was not in peril until the truck turned. Defendant's
liability under the humanitarian rule depends upon whether plaintiff's injuries
were caused by negligent acts of defendant after he saw or should have seen
plaintiff in a position of peril."''  The court then found that after the truck
had turned, and after the plaintiff had been placed in a position of peril, the
defendant thereafter had time to avert the injury, and his failure then to do so,
after the peril had arisen, was an act of humanitarian negligence making the
doctrine applicable.
It is submitted that the doctrine which underlies the decisions of the cases
typified by the instant case can be stated in this manner: The fundamental
difference between primary negligence and negligence under the humanitarian
doctrine is the present existence of a position of imminent peril. The human-
16. Ridge v. Jones, 335 Mo. 219, 224, 71 S. W. (2d) 713, 715 (1934).
17. 326 Mo. 282, 30 S. W. (2d) 1065 (1930).
18. Id. at 289, 30 S. W. (2d) at 1067.
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itarian doctrine presupposes that a position of imminent peril already exists.
If it is necessary for the defendant to commit a negligent act to create the
position of peril the doctrine is not applicable unless, thereafter, there is also
time for the defendant to avoid the collision in the exercise of reasonable care.
Every negligent act creates a position of peril; but if the act which creates the
peril is also the act which, immediately and without time or opportunity for
further action by the defendant, causes the injury, it is a case of primary
negligence rather than humanitarian negligence.19
LYNDON STURGIS
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR SIDEWALK STRUCTURES PLACED THERE BY THE ABUTTING
OWNER OR OCCUPIER
Watts v. R. A. Long Bldg. Corp.'
Plaintiff was injured as a result of slipping and falling on a metal grate which
had been placed in the sidewalk in front of the defendant's office building. The
metal plate, or grating, had originally been installed by the property owner for the
purpose of letting air into the boiler room of this building. It had not been used
for any purpose for several years. The plate had grown slick from pedestrians
walking over it for a number of years. It was firmly imbedded in and was flush
with the concrete sidewalk. The court held that the defendant was not liable for
plaintiff's injury, since the duty of keeping the public sidewalks in a reasonably
safe condition is on the municipality. It said that here there was no use of the
grill that was foreign to its use as a sidewalk; that as originally constructed it
afforded a smooth, unbroken, safe surface, and that regardless of any secondary
benefit it might afford the abutting land owner, it was primarily a sidewalk.
The court based its opinion on the case of Callaway 'v. Newman Mercantile
Co.,2 in which the offending structure in the sidewalk consisted of glass insets for
the purpose of admitting light, some of which were broken out, causing an injury
to the plaintiff. The court employed the same reasoning as in the principal case.
There is no duty on an abutting property owner to keep and maintain the
sidewalks adjoining his property in a safe condition, for this duty rests with the
municipality which owns it. . However, when the abutting owner or occupier con-
19. Contra Gaines, The Humanitarian Doctrine in Missouri (1935) 20 ST.
LouIs L. Rnv. 113, 124. After discussing the Bobos and Huckleberry cases,
supra note 9, Mr. Gaines says: "The two cases point out that the 'danger zone' is
sometimes established by the act of the defendant, and although the act of the
defendant creating the 'danger zone' and the act of negligence rendering the
defendant liable are one and the same, nevertheless the humanitarian doctrine
applied."
1. 142 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo. App. 1940).
2. 321 Mo. 766, 12 S. W. (2d) 491 (1928).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 349.
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structs any opening or other structure in the sidewalk for his benefit and con-
venience he does owe a duty to the public as regards this structure. 4 He must
not only construct it in such a manner that it is not a nuisance, but he must also
exercise due care in seeing that it is maintained in a reasonably safe condition
for use by the public as a thoroughfare.5 The courts seem almost unanimous in
their views on the liability of an abutting owner for injuries resulting from a
negligently maintained sidewalk opening, which is maintained for the benefit of
the owner or occupier.0 Where the municipality builds a sidewalk structure for
some purpose of its own, the duty to maintain and repair it is, of course, placed
upon the city, even though there may be a secondary benefit to an abutting oc-
cupier.7
The Missouri courts have made a distinction in these cases, based on whether
or not the use of the sidewalk by the adjoining proprietor is completely foreign
to its normal use as a sidewalk. When there is such a foreign use, as a coal-hole,
the courts have found the user liable for personal injuries resulting from neg-
ligent maintenance of these openings.8 But where the private use to be made of
the sidewalk structure is in no way foreign to its primary use as a public side-
walk, the Missouri courts have, in a series of comparatively recent decisions, 9 laid
down the rule that there is no duty on the property owner to repair these
structures; that this duty is on the municipality, as if the opening were in no way
used for the benefit of the adjoining building and had been constructed by the
city. In laying down this rule the court has reasoned that although there is a
secondary use made of these structures by the abutting proprietor, still the
primary use made of them is as public sidewalks; that there is nothing in these
secondary uses which is foreign to the use as a public sidewalk. The structure
as originally built afforded a reasonably safe public sidewalk, free from any
danger to pedestrians. Therefore, since these structures are in reality a part of
the public sidewalk, for which the city has the duty of maintenance, there is no
reason why the city's duty should not include these various gratings, glass insets,
and other types.
4. Id. § 350.
5. (1929) 62 A. L. R. 1067.
6. Runyon v. Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 383, 180 Pac. 837 (1919) (iron grat-
ing to admit light and air); Niehaus v. Caryfield, Inc., 240 App. Div. 144, 269 N. Y.
Supp. 335 (1934) (glass prisms inserted in the sidewalk, some of which were
broken out); Umphlette v. Silverton, 154 Ore. 156, 59 P. (2d) 244 (1936) (metal
door covering a sidewalk opening which was slick and smooth on its upper sur-
face); Citizens Savings Bank v. Covington, 174 Md. 633, 199 Atl. 849 (1938)
(sheet iron cellar door installed flush with the sidewalk); Kellems v. Schiele, 297
Ill. App. 388, 17 N. E. (2d) 604 (1938) (opening in sidewalk covered by a loose
sheet of iron); Harrington v. Alessi, 269 Mass. 433, 169 N. E. 495 (1929) (injury
caused by coal hole being improperly closed).
7. Robbins v. Jones, 15 C. B. N. S. 221 (1863) (gratings placed in sidewalk
area to provide light and air to tenements below).
8. Mancuso v. Kansas City, 74 Mo. App. 138 (1898); Stevens v. Walpole,
76 Mo. App. 213 (1898).
9. Breen v. Johnson Bros. Drug Co., 297 Mo. 176, 248 S. W. 970 (1923);
Callaway v. Newman Mercantile Co., 321 Mo. 766, 12 S. W. (2d) 491 (1928);
Watts v. R. A. Long Building Corp., 142 S. W. (2d) 98 (Mo. App. 1940).
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Missouri stands alone in its contention; no other jurisdiction has established
this distinction between the so-called "coal-hole" cases and cases involving per-
manent, immovable structures which are part of the sidewalk but benefit the
abutting property owner. Other courts in dealing with situations analagous to
those on which Missouri courts have based their doctrine, have repeatedly found
a duty resting upon the abutting property owner, his tenant, or anyone in com-
plete possession of the property.'0 A strong argument showing the unsoundness
of the Missouri rule is that its outcome would be to require the city to provide
structures of this kind more elaborate and expensive than the usual necessities
of the public would require.'1
It would seem that the court in the principal case, and those leading up to it,
has drawn an unwarranted distinction between types of sidewalk structures.
While it may have reached the proper result in this case, as the facts suggest
that the defendant might not have been negligent, still the case should have been
tried on that basis, for there clearly should be a duty placed on abutting property
holders to use reasonable care in the maintenance of sidewalk structures which
are constructed and used for their benefit and convenience.
ELMUS L. MONROE
TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUSE-CAUSATION IN FACT DIFFERENTIATED FROM LEGAL
CAUSATION
Rose v. Thompsonl
Three men were driving home from work one afternoon in a model A Ford
roadster. Plaintiff was seated on the right hand side of the car, the other
10. In Monsch v. Pellissier, 187 Cal. 790, 204 Pac. 224 (1922), the owner of
a building maintained a vault under the sidewalk and in the walk above installed
light wells consisting of iron gratings and glass, to furnish light to the vault;
the court held that despite the fact that the primary use of his structure was as a
sidewalk, the property owner was not relieved from a duty to keep the grating in
repair, since a secondary use of the grating was for his benefit. They were con-
structed for a use not contemplated in a normal sidewalk, for the benefit of
the property owner, therefore, the law casts a duty of reasonable care on the
defendant to keep these structures in a proper and safe condition. See (1922)
10 CALIF. L. REV. 358, where, in approving this decision, it is observed that the
property owner's liability did not arise from a duty to repair the sidewalk, but
rather from negligently maintaining an obstruction in the sidewalk. This duty
arises from the secondary use of the structure as a transom, for the benefit of an
individual. The case of Sanders v. First National Bank, 183 Okla. 112, 80 P. (2d)
207 (1938), dealt with a sidewalk constructed by the abutting property owner
in which glass had been placed to facilitate lighting. Some of this glass had been
broken, and as a result the plaintiff was injured. The court, after looking at
analagous decisions of other jurisdictions, found that the majority view was that
the abutting owner is under a duty to keep such structures in repair, despite
the fact that the duty to repair sidewalks is on the city. They cite the Missouri
case of Callaway v. Newman Mercantile Co., 321 Mo. 766, 12 S. W. (2d) 491
(1928), but say that the rule is unsound.
11. Sanders v. First National Bank, 183 Okla. 112, 80 P. (2d) 207 (1938).
1. 141 S. W. (2d) 824 (Mo. 1940).
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passenger in the middle. The driver stopped at the crossing, saw the defendant
train approaching and went onto the tracks thinking he could cross before the
train reached the crossing. Although the other passenger saw the oncoming
train, which was travelling at a rate of twelve to fifteen miles per hour, the
plaintiff was unaware of its approach. When the car stalled with its front wheels
just touching the far rail, the driver tried to pull it across by the starter. Failing
in this, he shouted that, "A train is coming," and that was the first notice plaintiff
had of the train's presence. Immediately plaintiff twisted the door handle, but
it had jammed and he was unable to open it. Then the passenger in the middle
kicked the door open and climbed out over the plaintiff. The driver escaped onto
the cowcatcher of the train, but before plaintiff could free himself the train
struck the automobile and injured him. Plaintiff proved that the defendant's
servants operating the train did not ring the warning-bell, and alleged: (1)
primary negligence in failure to give the statutory signals of warning, and (2)
humanitarian negligence in failing to give timely warning of the approach of the
train and to check the speed of the train. The Supreme Court of Missouri ruled
for defendant, stating that plaintiff had not proved the necessary causal connection
between the negligence of the defendant servants and the plaintiff injury.
There is no argument with the result of the decision, but rather with the
language and reasoning used by the court in reaching its holding. It says: "How-
ever, the essential issue in this case turns upon the matter of proximate cause.
A negligent act creates no liability for an injury not shown to have been caused
thereby. . . . There must be substantial evidence that the negligence for
which defendant was responsible caused or contributed to plaintiff's injuries
as a direct and proximate cause. .*"2 What does the court mean by "proxi-
mate cause"? Does "proximate cause" mean the same as "caused thereby"? Or
does it mean the same as "direct cause"?
Causation at best is a delicate problem, and it has been made more difficult
by the use of abstract terminology.3 "Proximate" is an ambiguous word. Causa-
tion consists of two distinct elements, actual causation or causation in fact, and
legal causation, and the courts must distinguish between them.4 The simplest way
2. Id. at 828.
3. Rosenberry, C. J., in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372
(1931); 24 WORDS AND PHRASES (1940) 530: "Negligence instructions may use
term 'legal cause,' or perhaps 'substantial factor,' to avoid misleading term 'proxi-
mate cause,' all of which are legal concepts, and not synonymous with physical
causation . . ."; Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause Determinable
By the Same Test?-Texas Decisions Analyzed (1923) 1 TEX. L. REv. 243: "It
(proximate) is not a word useful as a test. It rather identifies the results of the
test."
4. HARPER, ToRTs (1933) § 109: "Before any question of proximate or legal
cause can arise, it must first appear that the defendant's acts were the actual
cause or cause in fact of the harm in question"; Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of
Tort (1911) 25 HARv. L. REV. 103, 109; Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate
Cause (1922) 21 MIcH. L. REv. 34, 43, indicates the confusion of terminology of
causation. That aspect of causation to which he refers as "legal cause" is called
"actual cause" or "cause in fact" in this note, whereas the "legal cause" of this
note is his "proximate cause"; 24 WoRDs AND PHRASES (1940) 530; Osborne v.
Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N. W. 372 (1931) (this case summarizes causation
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to establish causation in fact is to ask: would the plaintiff have been injured "but
for" the negligence of the defendant? This establishes whether the proper causal
connection between negligence and injury does exist, that is, whether in fact there
is any causal connection. Obviously there will be such connection between many
injuries and negligent acts, for not all of which ought the defendants to be held
liable in damages. Social policy requires that the defendant must not be held
liable for all the consequences of his negligent act, and so actual causation is
delimited by legal causation to prevent liability from being carried to unreason-
able limits.5 The courts hold that the defendant's negligent act must not only be
the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury, but that it must also be the cause in
law of that injury, which is tantamount to saying that the court must decide
whether defendant should be forced to respond in damages for the particular
consequence of his act which was the injury to plaintiff. But not until the cause
in fact relation between the injury and the negligence has been established is
there any need to examine the problem to discover if the negligent act was also
the "legal,"( "efficient," 7 "substantial," s or "proximate" cause of the injury to
plaintiff.9
It has been pointed out above that it is impossible to discover the precise
sense in which the court in the instant case uses the phrase "proximate cause."
Is it in the sense of legal causation or of actual causation? When the court
says that it must be clear that ". . . absent the negligent act, the injury
would not have occurred,"1o it suggests the simple "but for" test of actual causa-
tion, but it cannot be ascertained certainly that such was the test the court finally
used. No doubt the reason for the ambiguity of the meaning of "proximate cause"
clearly and accurately); Edgerton, Legal Cause (1924) 72 U. op PA. L. REV. 211,
213; Pedigo v. Roseberry, 340 Mo. 724, 737, 102 S. W. (2d) 600, 608 (1937): The
mere fact that injury follows negligence does not necessarily create liability
. f the evidence merely established that the injury might have resulted
from several causes for some but not all of which appellants were liable, the
necessary causal connection remained in the realm of conjecture and speculation
and respondent's case failed."
5. See Annin v. Jackson, 340 Mo. 331, 100 S. W. (2d) 872 (1937): "To
authorize recovery, there must not only be a causal connection between neg-
ligence charged or hypothesized (and the injury), such that the injury would
not have happened but for such negligence, but negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury"; Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 183, 147 Atl. 762 (1929).
This case contains an accurate statement of the principles of causation. Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911) 25 HARV. L. REV. 103: "Do not some courts,
in laying down the rule of legal cause, proceed upon the supposition that one
problem before them is to determine when to exempt a tortfeasor from liability
for effects which were in reality caused by his tort?"; Edgerton, Legal Cause
(1924) 72 U. op PA. L. Rnv. 211; Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause
(1922) 21 MIcH. L. Rnv. 34, 43.
6. HARPER, op. cit. supra note 4, at 258: ". . . legal cause is, therefore, a
delimitation of cause in fact."
7. Cregger v. St. Charles, 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S. W. (2d) 750, 753 (1928).
8. RESTATEMENT, ToRTS (1934) § 431. The Restatement is the chief ex-
ponent of the "substantial factor" test. Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223,
234 N. W. 372 (1931) ; Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762 (1929).
9. Schneiter v. Chillicothe, 107 S. W. (2d) 112 (Mo. App. 1937); Alabama
Power Co. v. Bass, 218 Ala. 586, 119 So. 625 (1928).
10. Rose v. Thompson, 141 S. W. (2d) 824, 828 (Mo. 1940).
[Vo . 6
28
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1941], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol6/iss1/10
RECENT CASES
as used in this state is that we have three distinct types of cases using the same
phrase to denote distinctly different aspects of causation: (a) some cases use
the phrase to indicate causation in fact;1 (b) other cases use it to mean legal
causation; 12 (c) while still others apply the phrase to connote a jumble of actual
causation and legal causation.13 For example, in Kane v. Missouri Pacific Ry.,' 4
plaintiff alleged that he was injured when the train on which he was working
was derailed. The derailment occurring as the train was rounding a curve,
plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by splashing water in the tender
which upset the center of gravity. He contended that the water would not
have splashed had certain devices, called "splashers," been installed in the
tender, and alleged that defendant was negligent to omit such installation. The
Supreme Court of Missouri ruled for the defendant, saying that plaintiff did not
prove that the absence of splashers was the proximate cause of the injury to
plaintiff, nor that the injury would have been prevented had the splashers been
present. It declared that "proximate cause" is ". . . that (cause) which, in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces that event,
and without whik that event would not have occurred."'5 This definition in-
cludes both actual causation and legal causation without differentiation in a
case properly determinable solely upon the issue of actual causation, or causation
in fact. However, the identical definition is used in Jenkins v. Springfield Traction
Co.,'16 in a case hinging on legal causation.'7 In that case plaintiff was riding in
an automobile participating in a funeral procession. An officer on a motorcycle
lead the entourage. A servant of defendant so negligently managed one of de-
ll. Shunk v. Harvey, 284 Mo. 343, 223 S. W. 1066 (1920); King v. Rieth,
341 Mo. 467, 108 S. W. (2d) 1 (1937); Evans v. Massman Construction Co.,
343 Mo. 632, 122 S. W. (2d) 924 (1938) ; Glenn v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 Mo.
App. 109, 150 S. W. 1092 (1912).
12. Kennedy v. Independent Quarry & Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291
S. W. 475 (1927); Jenkins v. Springfield Traction Co., 230 Mo. App. 1235, 96
S. W. (2d) 620 (1936); Schneiter v. Chillicothe, 107 S. W. (2d) 112 (Mo.
App. 1937); Cregger v. St. Charles, 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S. W. (2d) 750 (1928);
George v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 286 S. W. 130 (Mo. App. 1926); Jaquith v.
Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 254 S. W. 89 (Mo. 1923).
13. Rose v. Thompson, 141 S. W. (2d) 824 (Mo. 1940); Stokes v. Spring-
field Wagon Co., 289 S. W. 987 (Mo. App. 1926); Hull v. Thomson Transfer Co.,
135 Mo. App. 119, 115 S. W. 1054 (1909). It is impossible to discover what phase
of causation is contemplated by the courts in these decisions. Perhaps some of
the cases noted above in notes 11 and 12 should also have been included in this
classification, but it appeared as if those courts were certain in their own minds
as to what they meant in their discussions of causation, and so they were given the
benefit of the doubt.
14 251 Mo. 13, 157 S. W. 644 (1913).
15. Id. at 27, 157 S. W. at 648.
16. 230 Mo. App. 1235, 96 S. W. (2d) 620 (1936).
17. Jaquith v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 254 S. W. 89 (Mo. 1923); Kennedy v.
Independent Quarry & Construction Co., 316 Mo. 782, 291 S. W. 475 (1927); Hull
v. Thomson Transfer Co., 135 Mo. App. 119, 115 S. W. 1054 (1909); Rose v.
Thompson, 141 S. W. (2d) 824 (Mo. 1940); Schneiter v. Chillicothe, 107 S. W. (2d)
112 (Mo. App. 1937) ; Glenn v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 167 Mo. App. 109, 150 S. W.
1092 (1912) ; George v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 286 S. W. 130 (Mo. App. 1926) ;
Stokes v. Springfield Wagon Co., 289 S. W. 987 (Mo. App. 1927); Cregger v. St.
Charles, 224 Mo. App. 232, 11 S. W. (2d) 750 (1928); Evans v. Massman Con-
struction Co., 343 Mo. 632, 122 S. W. (2d) 924 (1938), are cases utilizing this
definition of proximate cause."
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fendant's street cars that it struck the officer, knocking him off his motorcycle and
necessitating a sudden application of the brakes of the leading automobile in order
to avoid striking the officer. In the process of such sudden stopping of the entire
procession, the car in which plaintiff was riding was hit by the car immediately
behind it and it hit the car immediately in front of it, throwing plaintiff out
the door and onto the street, thus injuring him. The court ruled for the plaintiff.
There was no question as to the negligence of the defendant nor of actual causa-
tion. Legal causation was the only problem before the court. It cited the same
definition of proximate cause as the Kane court, and gave another definition in-
dicating its cognizance that the problem was one of legal causation.18 If legal
causation and causation in fact are entirely different, how can the same definition
be used to determine the presence of both?
The fruit of these two meanings of the phrase "proximate cause" is found
in a decision such as the instant case in which it is impossible to discover what
the court actually had in mind: whether the element of legal causation was not
properly proved, or whether it was causation in fact that was not present. It is
suggested that clarity would be more nearly achieved if in cases presenting causa-
tion questions, the courts would first establish causation in fact, and if it is
present, then decide the limits of liability by some test of legal causation.
JRURED BLANCHARD
18. 230 Mo. App. 1235, 1245, 96 S. W. (2d) 620, 625 (1936).
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